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Abstract—In this paper, we present two practical ARQ-Based
security schemes for Wi-Fi and RFID networks. Our proposed
schemes enhance the confidentiality and authenticity functions
of these networks, respectively. Both schemes build on the
same idea; by exploiting the statistical independence between
the multipath fading experienced by the legitimate nodes and
potential adversaries, secret keys are established and then are
continuously updated. The continuous key update property of
both schemes makes them capable of defending against all of the
passive eavesdropping attacks and most of the currently-known
active attacks against either Wi-Fi or RFID networks. However,
each scheme is tailored to best suit the requirements of its
respective paradigm. In Wi-Fi networks, we overlay, rather than
completely replace, the current Wi-Fi security protocols. Thus,
our Wi-Fi scheme can be readily implemented via only minor
modifications over the IEEE 802.11 standards. On the other hand,
the proposed RFID scheme introduces the first provably secure
low cost RFID authentication protocol. The proposed schemes
impose a throughput-security tradeoff that is shown, through our
analytical and experimental results, to be practically acceptable.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent research on wireless information theoretic security
has been largely motivated by the seminal works of Wyner
on the wiretap channel [1], [2]. In those works, two users
want to exchange secure messages over noisy channels, in
the presence of an eavesdropper that is also impaired by a
noisy channel. [1] shows that a non-zero secrecy capacity
(the maximum achievable secure rate) is achievable, without
any assumptions on the computational power available to
the eavesdropper or the presence of a private key that is
shared between the legitimate users, if the eavesdropper’s
channel is a degraded version of the legitimate one. This result
was later extended to the non-degraded channel scenario in
[3]. The effect of multipath fading on the secrecy capacity
was studied in several recent works (e.g., [4], [5]). These
works showed that the secrecy capacity could be enhanced
if the secure message is judicially distributed across different
channel fading realizations. Building on this principle, in our
previous works [6], [7], we developed a framework for sharing
keys over multipath fading channels using ARQ feedback.
Under the assumption of a public and error-free ARQ feedback
channel, the achievability of non-zero key rates, even when the
eavesdropper is enjoying relatively better channel conditions (a
higher average signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)) than the legitimate
receiver, was established.
Inspired by the aforementioned results, we develop the first
ARQ-based security protocols for two popular, and severely
flawed, wireless communication paradigms: Wi-Fi and RFID.
More specifically, the key idea enabling our design is the
opportunistic secrecy principle which allows for exploiting the
statistical independence between the multipath fading experi-
enced by the legitimate nodes and adversaries to enhance the
confidentiality and the authenticity functions of the underlying
protocols.
For Wi-Fi networks, through a uniform treatment of the
three existing Wi-Fi security protocols, we further extend
our previous work [8] to a security overlay that provides
information theoretic confidentiality guarantees to complement
the security guarantees offered by the underlying protocols.
By judiciously using the existing Automatic Repeat reQuest
(ARQ) protocol in the IEEE 802.11 standard, our overlay
relies on the opportunistic secrecy principle to establish a
secret key that is shared only by the legitimate nodes; as
described in the sequel. Remarkably, this goal is achieved
through only minor modifications in the MAC layer. Our
experimental results, obtained from our prototype implemen-
tation using the Madwifi driver, demonstrate the ability of our
approach to defend against all of the passive Wi-Fi attacks and
all of the currently known active attacks, at the expense of a
minor loss in throughput and a small increase in link setup
time, that are shown to be practically acceptable.
Moreover, we propose an ARQ-based provably secure RFID
authentication protocol. Our novel scheme employs a low
cost ARQ-based approach to securely share a secret key
between the RFID reader and the tag and perform mutual
authentication, in the presence of a passive eavesdropper. Our
analytical results show the ability of our scheme to defend
against passive attacks, demonstrating the attained tradeoff
between secrecy and throughput. In addition, several key active
attack techniques are shown to be inhibited.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II gives an overview of the existing security protocols and
their corresponding attacks in both Wi-Fi and RFID networks.
In Sections III and IV, we provide the details of our proposed
schemes, as well as a rigorous analysis of their security
and performance in Wi-Fi and RFID networks, respectively.
Finally, Section V offers some concluding remarks.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Wi-Fi Security
Since the emergence of the IEEE 802.11 standard, there
have been numerous efforts to design provable and user
friendly security protocols. These efforts resulted in three
major security protocols, namely, the WEP (Wired Equivalent
Privacy), WPA and WPA2 (Wi-Fi Protected Access) protocols.
In general, the security functions of those protocols could be
separated into three layers, namely, an authentication layer, an
access control layer and a WLAN layer [9]. The processes
involved with encrypting and decrypting frames are found in
the WLAN layer solely (WEP, the Temporal Key Integrity
Protocol (TKIP), and the Counter Mode with Cipher Block
Chaining Message Authentication Code Protocol (CCMP)).
All of those protocols attempt to use a fresh key for securing
each transmitted frame using special security parameters. In
the WEP protocol, a 24-bit value, called the Initialization
Vector (IV), is generated and then combined with a secret
root key. The result of this process is used for encrypting each
frame. TKIP makes use of a similar 48-bit value, called TKIP
Sequence Counter (TSC), while CCMP generates the Packet
Number (PN), which is of length 48 bits as well. Since those
parameters will be needed for decryption at the receiver, they
are sent, in-the-clear, in the transmitted frame’s header. For
the purpose of this paper, we use the symbol V to refer to
WEP’s IV, TKIP’s TSC or CCMP’s PN.
We now give a summary on the confidentiality-related at-
tacks on the three Wi-Fi security protocols. Borisov, Goldberg,
and Wagner first reported WEP design failures in [10]. Later,
the first key recovery attack against WEP (the FMS attack)
was presented by Fluhrer, Mantin and Shamir [11] using
some weaknesses of the RC4 Key Scheduling Algorithm. The
KoreK chopchop attack attempted at breaking WEP using the
CRC32 checksum (the ICV test) [12]. KoreK also presented
another large group of attacks [13]. A rather efficient iterative
algorithm that recovers the WEP key was later proposed by
Klein in [14]. On the other hand, the Bittau attack made
use of the fragmentation support of IEEE 802.11 to break
WEP [15]. Finally, Pyshkin, Tews, and Weinmann presented
more enhancements to the Klein attack by using ranking tech-
niques [16]. At the moment, this recent attack is considered
to be the most powerful attack against WEP.
In 2004, weaknesses in the temporal key hash of TKIP
were shown [17]. An attacker could use the knowledge of
a few keystreams and TSCs to predict the Temporal Key
and the MIC Key used in TKIP. Later in 2008, Tews and
Beck [18] made the first practical attack against TKIP. In
this attack, an attacker can recover the plaintext of a short
packet and falsify it within about 12-15 minutes. Based on
this attack, in 2009, a practical falsification attack against
TKIP was proposed [19], which shortens the attack time to
about one minute. Finally, CCMP arguably provides the most
robust form of security nowadays. However, a weakness in
the nonce construction mechanism in CCMP was recently
discovered [20]. A predictable PN in CCMP was shown to
decrease the effective encryption key length from 128 bits to
85 bits [20].
In summary, the previously mentioned statistical attacks rely
on collecting a large number of ciphertext along with the
corresponding security parameters (e.g. the IV in WEP) which
are sent in-the-clear, whether through passive eavesdropping
or innovative active techniques. The remaining attacks may not
need a large number of eavesdropped frames. They, however,
critically depend on the availability of the frames’ security
parameters as plaintext. As detailed in the sequel, our proposed
overlay transforms those security parameters into a secret key
that is only shared by the legitimate nodes, and thus, defends
against those attacks.
B. RFID Security
Typically, an RFID system consists of three main com-
ponents: an interrogator (reader), a transponder (tag), and a
back-end database (server)1. Low-cost RFID tags have limited
computational capabilities, which makes them incapable of
performing sophisticated cryptographic operations. Since tags
respond to interrogation without alerting the user, users have
become concerned with the security and privacy ramifications
associated with RFID. This lead to the need to achieve mutual
authentication between the reader and the tag, so that sensitive
information are only communicated between authentic parties.
A variety of RFID schemes that achieve mutual authen-
tication between readers and tags were proposed. The work
of Peris-Lopez et al. (e.g., [21]) introduced multiple mutual
authentication protocols that depend on using only bitwise
operations. However, they were shown to be insecure against
several kinds of passive attacks [22]. Later on, it was shown
that secure mutual authentication cannot be achieved by using
only bitwise operations [23]. To achieve enhanced security
levels, schemes that depend on hash-locks were proposed.
The basic idea behind these schemes is to achieve privacy
preservation by hashing the ID of the tag. Typically, a random
nonce R is generated, concatenated with the ID, and the hash
of the overall string is sent to the reader. In all these schemes,
the reader is required to perform an exhaustive search over
the back-end database in order to find a matching tag ID. A
wide set of symmetric key solutions were also proposed, in
addition to other solutions that depend on NP-hard problems,
such as the learning parity with noise (LPN) problem as in
[24]. Although hash-lock schemes are designed to provide high
security levels, an assumption is made here that the attacker
(either active or passive) has no access to the tags ID space,
and thus will not be able to unlock the hash and uncover the
ID of the tag.
1Throughout the sequel, we make no distinction between the reader and
the server.
To sum up, the main bottom layer of all these RFID
protocols is the supposition that the employed cryptographic
primitives are computationally secure. That is, it is computa-
tionally hard for a attacker to recover the secret information,
without knowing the secret key. In fact, in schemes that
employ hash-locks or privacy preservation, the reader behaves
like a brute force attacker, with an additional advantage which
is that the brute forcing space is reduced to the actual number
of tags in the system. These schemes, however, do not prevent
a passive eavesdropper from recovering secret information
by, for example, statistical analysis or even brute forcing
the secret key. That says, these schemes are not provably
secure. Recently, a step towards information theoretic secrecy
for RFID is made by Alomair et al. in [25], in which they
transmit a random nonce from the reader to the tag using
only modulo p addition and multiplication operations, where
p is a large prime number. However, their scheme is based
on the assumption that recovering the value of a nonce by
eavesdropping enough protocol runs is impractical in RFID,
which questions the actual resiliency of the scheme to passive
key disclosure and statistical analysis attacks.
Based on information theoretic principles, we provide the
first provably secure scheme for RFID. We show that through
employing a simple ARQ-based approach, our proposed RFID
scheme provides provable security without any limiting as-
sumptions on the eavesdropper.
III. ARQ SECURITY FOR WI-FI NETWORKS
A. Protocol Description
Our proposed overlay is designed for Wi-Fi networks
operating in infrastructure mode that may use any of the
IEEE802.11 security protocols, i.e., WEP, TKIP or CCMP for
encryption. The network is composed of one AP and L clients,
in the presence of one attacker. The AP and all clients follow
the ARQ mechanism adopted in the IEEE 802.11 standard.
In this paper, we assume disabled retransmissions2. In the
proposed overlay, we transform the V values of different
frames into additional private keys that are shared among
the legitimate nodes. The proposed protocol works in two
phases. (a) The Initialization Phase: this is where the AP
and each client agree on a secret key V0 that is distributed
across many ARQ epochs and then used to initialize the V
values for the encrypted data frames. This phase occurs before
any data exchange is allowed. (b) The Data Exchange Phase:
here the AP and the clients transmit or receive data frames
(whether unicast or multicast) while their V values are being
continuously updated using our overlay.
For ease of presentation, we begin by using a simple three-
node network model. In this network, Alice corresponds to
one legitimate client, Bob corresponds to the AP and Eve
is a malicious attacker. We later show how to extend our
scheme to secure multicast flows. Each pairwise channel in
this network is assumed to be a block erasure channel. At time
2The analysis provided in this paper could be easily extended to the case
of enabled retransmissions.
Fig. 1. The initialization phase.
slot i, we denote the the erasure probability of each channel
by γXY (i) ∈ [0, 1], where X is the transmitter and Y is the
receiver for that channel. The erasure probabilities are assumed
to be random variables which are correlated across users but
independent and identically distributed over time.
1) The Initialization Phase: The initialization phase works
as illustrated in Figure 1. First, Alice transmits an initialization
frame, carrying a sequence number 1 and a uniformly chosen
random number R1, and starts a timer. Once Bob receives this
frame, he replies with another initialization frame, carrying
a sequence number 2, and another random number R2. If
Alice receives this frame before a timeout event occurs, she
stores the pair (R1, R2) for later use, and transmits another
initialization frame with sequence number 3 and a new random
number R3. Otherwise (a timeout event occurs), Alice discards
R1, and transmits another initialization frame with sequence
number 1 and a new random number R3. On the other
side, Bob keeps on responding to each initialization frame
he gets with a sequence number incremented by one, and a
newly generated random number. However, he stores only the
last pair it has for any given sequence number. The process
continues till Alice and Bob has stored n initialization random
values (exhausting m trials, as shown in Figure 1). The length
of each transmitted random number is 24 bits if WEP is used,
or 48 bits otherwise. Finally, the secret key, V0, is the modulo-
2 sum of the random number pairs successfully received by
both Alice and Bob.
2) The Data Exchange Phase: Right after initialization, our
protocol works on updating the V values, used to encapsulate
each transmitted data frame. For unicast data flows, first
consider the ith data frame to be securely transmitted, using
any security protocol, from Alice to Bob. Alice starts by
generating a random number (of length 24 if WEP is used,
or 48 bits otherwise) referred to as the header-V, Vh(i). The
protocol must not use two consecutive equal header-V’s. This
property will be shown to be useful for defending against
replay attacks. This value, Vh(i), is put in the frame’s security
header, according to the specifications of the security protocol
used. However, unlike the standards, the value used by our
scheme in encapsulating the frame, denoted by Ve(i), is the
modulo-2 sum of the current header-V, Vh(i), and all of the
header-V’s previously transmitted by Alice and successfully
received by Bob. The update equation for Ve is then
Ve(i)=
{
Vh(i)
⊕
Ve(i− 1), if Q(i− 1) = 1,
Vh(i)
⊕
Ve(i− 1)
⊕
Vh(i − 1), otherwise,
(1)
where Q(i) = 1 if Alice received an ACK for the ith
transmitted frame, Q(i) = 0 otherwise. This status is obtained
through an ACK/Timeout detection module running at Alice.
The initial value for this algorithm is set by the agreed-upon V0
of the initialization phase, i.e., Ve(0) = V0, while Vh(0) = 0.
Similarly, when Bob receives the ith frame, he first extracts
Vh(i) from the security header, and then performs a check. If
Vh(i) = Vh(i − 1), Bob discards the frame and treats it as a
sign of a replay attack. If not, Bob attempts to decapsulate the
frame with Vd(i),
Vd(i) = Vh(i)
⊕
Vd(i − 1), (2)
where Vd(0) = V0. If decryption fails (an ICV failure occurs),
this would be due to an erasure of the (i − 1)th ACK. Bob
then goes through another decryption attempt, after excluding
Vh(i − 1) from the sum, i.e., with Vd(i) = Vh(i)
⊕
Vd(i −
1)
⊕
Vh(i − 1). Another failure in decryption is treated as a
sign of an attack and countermeasures could be invoked (the
reason behind this will become clear in the security analysis
to follow). Following this protocol, Alice and Bob perfectly
agree on the V values used for each frame. We avoid any
mis-synchronization that could happen due to the loss of an
ACK frame; without any additional feedback bits. The unicast
flow from Bob to Alice could be secured in the same manner
illustrated above.
Our scheme for multicast traffic goes as follows. Whenever
a client subscribes to a multicast group, g, the AP sends a new
random value, Vg , to every associated client that belongs to
this group along with an ID for this Vg value (the updates
can be periodic or triggered based on group membership
changes). Those values are transmitted to each client over its
secure pairwise link with the AP, i.e., as encrypted frames.
Once the AP makes sure that all clients in the group have
received Vg , through individual ACKs, the AP uses this value
to compute Veg , that will be used for encapsulating each
upcoming multicast frame, within this group, i.e.,
Veg (i) = Vh(i)
⊕
Vg, (3)
where Vh(i) is a random header-V as illustrated before. Vh(i)
and the ID of the used Vg are sent in the header of the multicast
frame. Similarly, for members of a particular multicast group
g, a client uses the recovered information from the security
header to compute Vdg (i) and decapsulate any multicast frame
addressed to this group. Any failure in decryption (ICV test
failure) is treated as a sign of attack. Finally, the AP should
not use repeated Vh values within the lifetime of a certain Vg .
Similarly, whenever a client receives a multicast frame, it must
check for this condition and treat repeated Vh’s as a sign of
attack.
B. Security Analysis
1) Passive Eavesdropping: The security of this protocol
in the presence of a passive Eve directly builds on the
results provided in [6], [8]. More specifically, as Eve becomes
completely blind about V0 if she misses one of the values
constituting it, the probability that Eve correctly computes V0
is
P0 =
∏
i∈A
(1− γAE(i))
∏
j∈B
(1 − γBE(j)), (4)
where A and B are the sets of time indices that corre-
spond to the frames stored by Alice and Bob, respectively.
γAE(1), . . . , γAE(n − 1) denote the frame loss probabilities
in the Alice-Eve channel whereas γBE(2), . . . , γBE(n) denote
the frame loss probabilities in the Bob-Eve channel. All of
those probabilities are random variables that are independently
and identically distributed according to Eve’s channels’ dis-
tributions. Since the size of each of A and B is n/2. It is
evident that, as n increases, P0 decreases and we achieve
better security gains, at the expense of a larger delay in the
initialization phase.
In our scheme, the collected traffic by a passive Eve
becomes useful for any attack depending on Eve’s ability to
correctly compute Ve for each captured frame. To achieve this,
for unicast flows, Eve first has to correctly compute V0, in
the initialization phase between Alice and Bob. This happens
with probability P0 (as given in Eq. (4)). Afterwards, for each
captured frame, Eve has to keep track of all the previously
acknowledged data frames preceding that frame. Eve becomes,
again, completely blind if she misses a single acknowledged
frame. Based on this observation, we let u denote the total
number of data frames that Eve can correctly compute their
Ve, i.e., the useful frames for Eve. If γAE = γBE = γE for
all time indices, the expected number of such frames is upper-
bounded by3
E[u] ≤
E[γ´E ]
n+1 − E[γ´E ]
N+1
E[γE ]
, (5)
where γ´E = 1 − γE , n is the total number of initialization
frames constituting V0 and N is the unicast data session size.
As shown in Eq. (5), a slight increase of the number of
initialization frames results in a significant decrease in the
number of useful frames for Eve in each session. Moreover, a
passive Eve cannot make use of any of the multicast frames,
as secure pairwise links are used to incorporate hidden and
periodically-updated values into multicast Ve’s. This has a
direct impact on the feasibility of many attacks, especially
the statistical WEP attacks, e..g. [11], as those depend on
collecting a large number of IVs (Ve’s in the ARQ overlay
case) to run efficiently.
2) Active Eavesdropping: If Eve is active, she will be
capable of injecting or replaying initialization or data frames.
However, any replay or injection attempt would lead to a
decryption failure at the legitimate recipients who will then
3This bound is derived for the case in which Eve is perfectly capable of
tracking the status of each transmitted data frame.
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Fig. 2. The average number of useful frames at Eve. E[γAB ] =
0.005,E[γBA] = 0.009 and E[γAE ] = 0.004.
treat this as a sign of an attack and countermeasures could
follow. The most straightforward countermeasure is to change
the keys of the whole network or of the attacked sessions.
Still, for unicast flows, the history of the V values built up
thus far would still be used after invoking countermeasures.
C. Experimental Results
Our experiments are conducted with a modified version of
the Madwifi driver that has the capabilities of the proposed
overlay. All of our testbed nodes are Dell Latitude D830
laptops that are equipped with Atheros-based D-Link DWL-
G650 WLAN cards. All traffic is generated using Netperf [26].
1) Security: One-way traffic was generated between a client
node (Alice) and the AP (Bob) in the presence of one
eavesdropper (Eve). Eve’s driver was equipped with the ARQ-
based algorithms, i.e. Eve calculates Ve for each frame based
on the captured traffic. In our experiment, Eve had relatively
better channel conditions, as compared to Bob4. We compared
the Ve values that Eve and Bob obtained for each frame, and
calculated the number of useful frames for Eve (with different
numbers of initialization frames). The results are reported in
log scale in Figure 2. The data session size is taken to be
100000 frames. These results can be used to estimate the
required time for Eve to capture a total of 1.5 million useful
frames that is typically required to launch a combined form
of the FMS and KoreK attacks ([27]). Under the original
WEP operation, we assume that Eve needs 10 minutes to
gather such traffic using passive eavesdropping only. Based on
this estimate, using ARQ-WEP protocol extends the required
average listening time for Eve to 1.24 years, using only an
initialization overhead of 0.001. Finally, we note that under the
ARQ overlay operation, Eve cannot use any active techniques
to reduce the listening time. Consequently, any statistical WEP
attack would becomes virtually impossible using our overlay.
For TKIP and CCMP, the decreased number of useful frames
at Eve hampers her ability to exploit the weaknesses that were
previously discussedin Section II.
2) Throughput: Here we compare the performance of the
proposed overlay with the baseline software implementations
of WEP, TKIP, and CCMP in the Madwifi driver. To ob-
tain a measure of performance if the proposed overlay was
implemented in hardware, we also include the results of all
4We also report the results of a similar experiment in [8], where all nodes
suffered from worse channel conditions.
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Fig. 3. Network throughput for TCP flows with different security protocols.
hardware implementations. Figure 3 reports the aggregate
network throughput for TCP flows, with different packet sizes,
for WEP, TKIP, and CCMP. One can see that using the
ARQ-based overlay on top of WEP (ARQ-WEP) results in a
throughput degradation of 11.57% over the Madwifi software
implementation of WEP (SW-WEP), for a packet size of
1500 bytes. The corresponding degradation for TKIP and
CCMP is 15.61% and 15.26%, respectively. This quantifies the
processing overhead of the additional ARQ-related operations.
As the packet size increases, the overhead introduced by the
ARQ-protocol decreases, as it is amortized over a larger packet
size.
IV. ARQ SECURITY FOR RFID NETWORKS
A. Protocol Description
We follow the same three-node system model illustrated
in Section III, where Alice corresponds to the reader, Bob
to the tag, and Eve to the passive eavesdropper. Our scheme
consists of three stages: 1) ARQ-based key sharing stage, 2)
reader authentication stage, and 3) tag authentication stage.
The three stages work together to defend against passive and
active attacks on the system. Initially, the tag and the reader
are assumed to share a pseudo-identity IDS, a secret key
(k ≡ k1||k2||k3||k4||k5), where || denotes the string concate-
nation operation, along with the unique tag identifier ID. All
identifiers and key components are assumed to be of length
ℓ bits. We also assume that the reader initiates the protocol,
and that both the tag and the reader are capable of computing
a pseudo-random function (PRF) fs : {0, 1}2ℓ → {0, 1}2ℓ,
where s is a seed. The details of each stage are given below.
1) ARQ Stage: In this stage, the reader sends to the tag m
random numbers (drawn uniformly over the binary alphabet
{0, 1}). The tag responds in turn with a single ACK bit, or
does not reply for a NACK. Similar to Section III-A1, the
frames from the reader to the tag are sequenced in a manner
that overcomes the loss of ACKs. The agreed upon key (k′ ≡
k′1||k
′
2||k
′
3||k
′
4||k
′
5), is distilled as the modulo-2 sum of the
successfully acknowledged frames. The ARQ stage acts as a
shield to the remaining two stages as shown next.
2) Reader Authentication Stage: This stage proceeds as
follows.
a) The tag chooses a random nonce NT and transmits
[IDS ⊕ k′1, NT ⊕ k
′
2] to the reader.
b) The reader chooses a random nonce NR, computes
m1 ≡ fk1⊕k′3 (NT , NR), and transmits
[NR ⊕ k2 ⊕ k
′
4,m1] to the tag. The reader then
updates the stored pseudo-identity and the secret key
to:
IDSnew = IDS ⊕ k3 ⊕NR, and knew = k ⊕ k′.
c) The tag recomputes and checks m1, and authenticates
the reader or aborts.
In the next stage, the reader authenticates the tag in a similar
manner.
3) Tag Authentication Stage:
a) The tag computes m2 ≡ fk4⊕k′3 (ID,NR) and trans-
mits [ID ⊕ k5 ⊕ k′5,m2] to the reader. The tag then
updates the stored pseudo-identity and the secret key
in the same way as in stage 2.
b) The reader recomputes and checks m2, and authen-
ticates the tag or aborts.
The security of our proposed scheme is analyzed in the
following section.
B. Security Analysis
1) Passive Attacks: Using our scheme, and similar to the
results in Section III, Eve becomes completely blind about the
distilled key if she misses a single acknowledged frame. In
addition, she also blinds if she misses a single ACK bit, as
she would not be capable of performing a brute force attack
on the status of each frame. In fact, in typical RFID scenarios,
the tag (Bob) will be in close proximity to the reader (Alice)
than it is to Eve and, since the radiated signal power from
the tag is, by orders of magnitude, smaller than the signal of
the reader [28] which results in a higher probability for Eve to
loose the tag responses rather than to loose the random frames
sent by the reader. Hence, the secrecy outage probability in our
case is given by
Pr
out1
=
∏
i∈A
(
1− γAE(i)
)(
1− γBE(i)
)
. (6)
where A is the set, with cardinality n, of the time indices
corresponding to the frames successfully acknowledged by
Bob. We here assume that the ACK responses, being of
short length, occur within the same fading realization of their
corresponding random number frames.
We investigate another interesting case in which Eve knows,
a priori, the current IDS of the tag (e.g., by interrogating the
tag in a preceding protocol run). This would enable her to
extract k′1 (which is the prefix of the ARQ key) and to then
exhaustively XOR in and out the sniffed random frames sent
by the reader, until a matching prefix is found and thus, Eve
becomes capable of overcoming the loss of ACK bits. With
this added brute force capability at Eve, the probability of
secrecy outage increases to
Pr
out2
=
∏
i∈A
(
1− γAE(i)
)
, (7)
In this case, if Eve looses ℓ ACKs, the complexity of her
exhaustive search will blow up to O(2ℓ). Hence, loosing a
single acknowledged frame, or ℓ or more ACKs beats Eve
back to brute force. On this account, the expected value of the
probability of secrecy outage when Eve is computationally
limited, such that she is capable of completing, in polynomial
time, a brute force search of length less than ℓ, is given by
E
[
Pr
out3
]
= E
[
1− γAE
]n
E
[
1− γBE
]n−ℓ+1
·
[ ℓ−1∑
i=0
(
n− ℓ+ i
i
)
E
[
γBE
]i]
.
(8)
Figure 4 illustrates these bounds for m = 30, ℓ = 10, a
fixed E[γAE ] of 0.02, and different values of E[γBE ].
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Fig. 4. Probability of secrecy outage for m = 30, ℓ = 10, E[γAB ] = 0.01,
E[γAE(i)] = 0.02, and for different values of E[γBE ].
Figure 5 captures the secrecy outage probability for various
combinations of E[γAE ] and E[γBE ], for the two cases when
Eve knows the IDS of the tag and is computationally limited
as in Eq. (8), and when she does not a priori know the IDS
of the tag as in Eq. (6), respectively. As shown, significant
secrecy gains can be achieved even when the erasure proba-
bilities for Eve’s channels are as low as 0.01.
The choice of m is essential for obtaining good security
bounds, as well as reducing the communication overhead and
the delay induced by the ARQ phase. Figure 6(a) shows the
probability of secrecy outage for different values of m, a
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Fig. 5. Probability of secrecy outage for different combinations of E[γAE ]
and E[γBE ]. E[γAB ] = 0.001, n = 30, and ℓ = 10.
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Fig. 6. Probability of secrecy outage for different values of m.
fixed ℓ = 10, and a fixed erasure probability of 0.05 for
Eve’s channels. From the figure, it is clear that the secrecy
outage probability vanishes as m increases. Interestingly, our
scheme grants a vanishing secrecy outage probability, even if
Eve is experiencing a better SNR value than the legitimate
parties. Figure 6(b) illustrates this for E[γAB] = 0.05, while
E[γAE ] = E[γBE ] = 0.02.
From the aforementioned discussion, it becomes clear that
our scheme is provably secure against passive attacks. The
probability of secrecy outage, incorporated by our scheme,
reaches its minimum when the eavesdropper cannot link a
previously obtained IDS to the victim tag. Additionally,
updating the keys and the pseudo-identity of tags insures their
freshness, which prevents tracking attacks as well.
2) Key Disclosure Attacks: In [29], a full disclosure attack
against the protocol of Kim et al. [30] is illustrated. The attack
depends on capturing multiple sessions with the same session
nonce. The attack reveals the permanent secret key using a
number of sessions that is extremely less than that needed for
a brute force search. Since our scheme is secure against pas-
sive attacks, key disclosure by passive eavesdropping is thus
defeated. In addition, an active adversary that is pretending
to be a legitimate reader cannot initiate key disclosure attacks
by interrogating the tag, since the tag transmits no sensitive
information until after the reader authentication step. On the
other hand, an active adversary may pretend to be a legitimate
tag and may collect frames from the reader for a specific
IDS. However, this can be easily detected by the reader as
it will recognize so many failed or incomplete authentication
attempts that are associated with the victim IDS, and therefore
countermeasures can be employed.
3) Synchronization Loss: It is typical that the tag and reader
update their keys only when the mutual authentication phase is
completed. As this phase can be interrupted, either accidentally
or intentionally, the tag and the reader may be desynchronized.
To resolve that, we follow the same approach used in [25]:
the reader stores the old keys and always updates its keys
at step (2). When the tag returns, the reader will first try to
authenticate it using the new keys. If this fails, the reader
switches to the old keys and authenticates the tag, without
giving it any further privileges, and then starts another protocol
round with the tag using the new keys,. The tag is completely
authenticated only if that second round succeeded. This way,
the reader ensures that the tag is legitimate.
4) Forward Secrecy: Assuming that, at a time t, the ad-
versary is given all the communication information between
tags and readers along with all the information stored in
a compromised tag. Forward secrecy requires the adversary
not to be able to trace any past communication between the
compromised tag and readers at any time t′ < t [31]. In
our scheme, as tag’s pseudo-identity and keys are refreshed;
compromising a tag will not reveal any information about
previously transmitted data. Thus, forward secrecy is achieved.
C. Performance Analysis
We investigate the throughput-secrecy tradeoff governed by
the number of achievable tag reads per second. A typical data
rate of an HF reader of 106 kbps, and a tag read rate of 50
times per second [32] are assumed. We assume a key compo-
nent length (ℓ) of 10 bits, and that E[γAE ] = E[γBE ] = 0.05.
Figure 7 illustrates the secrecy-throughput tradeoff associated
with our scheme for different values of m. We ignore the delay
caused by the three mutual authentication steps of the scheme.
We are also assuming that the processing time required to
XOR the random ARQ frames is negligible. The figure shows
that our scheme is capable of achieving significant security
gains, without great loss in throughput. For example, for
m = 100, the scheme can achieve as low as 3× 10−5 secrecy
outage probability, and approximately 20 tag reads per second.
Finally, table I summarizes the computational, communica-
tion, and storage overhead associated with our scheme.
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Fig. 7. Throughput-secrecy tradeoff for different values of m. We assume
a typical HF reader data rate of 106 kbps, a key component length (ℓ) of 10
bits, and that E[γAE ] = E[γBE ] = 0.05.
No. of RNG operations Reader : m+ 1Tag : 1
No. of PRF operations Reader : 2Tag : 2
Protocol steps m+ 3
Memory size 14ℓ
TABLE I
COMPUTATION, COMMUNICATION, AND MEMORY REQUIREMENTS.
V. CONCLUSION
Inspired by information theoretic results, this paper devel-
oped two ARQ-based security schemes for Wi-Fi and RFID
networks. The basic idea behind both schemes is to exploit the
multipath fading characteristics of the wireless channel. The
scheme developed for Wi-Fi protocols essentially enhances
the confidentiality guarantees of Wi-Fi networks. When key
management is a burden, which is the case in open access
networks, our scheme opens a path for keyless confidentiality
in these networks. Moreover, the principles introduced in
this paper could be further extended to secure the currently
deployed authentication protocols in Wi-Fi networks. Our
second scheme, to the best of our knowledge, is the first
low-cost RFID authentication scheme that provides provable
security against passive attacks. Consequently, the currently
known key attacks against RFID, such as key disclosure
and tracking attacks, are totally inhibited. Finally, through
our analytical and experimental results, we demonstrated the
governing tradeoff between our secrecy gains and the network
throughput and its practical appeal.
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